Sharing the Proceeds from a Hierarchical Venture by Hougaard, Jens Leth et al.
 2015/31 
 
 
■ 
 
 
 
 
Sharing the Proceeds from a Hierarchical Venture 
 
Jens Leth Hougaard, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero,  
Mich Tvede and Lars Peter Østerdal	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CORE 
Voie du Roman Pays 34, L1.03.01 
B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium. 
Tel (32 10) 47 43 04 
Fax (32 10) 47 43 01 
E-mail: immaq-library@uclouvain.be 
http://www.uclouvain.be/en-44508.html	  
CORE DISCUSSION PAPER
2015/31
Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture
Jens Leth Hougaard1, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero2, Mich Tvede3, Lars Peter Østerdal4
July 2015
Abstract
We consider the problem of distributing the proceeds generated from a
joint venture in which the participating agents are hierarchically orga-
nized. We introduce and characterize a family of allocation rules where
revenue ‘bubbles up’ in the hierarchy. The family is flexible enough to
accommodate a no-transfer rule (where no revenue bubbles up) and
a full-transfer rule (where all the revenues bubble up to the top of
the hierarchy). Intermediate rules within the family are reminiscent of
popular incentive mechanisms for social mobilization. Our benchmark
model refers to the case of linear hierarchies, but we also extend the
analysis to the case in which hierarchies may convey a general tree
structure and include joint ownerships.
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1 Introduction
Agents often organize themselves into hierarchies when involved in joint ven-
tures (e.g., Mookherjee, 2006). There exist numerous reasons to explain this
fact. For instance, ownership or power structures generate natural hierar-
chies with related chains of command and responsibility (e.g., Ichniowski
and Shaw, 2003). It is also argued that workplace structures that are rich in
sequentiality are desirable from the point of view of incentives (e.g., Winter,
2010). Demange (2004) further shows that hierarchies yield stable coopera-
tion structures when it comes to allocating resources. Hierarchies may also
relate to crowdsourcing and social mobilization systems (e.g., Pickard et al.,
2011), as well as multi-level marketing (e.g., Emek et al., 2011), task solving
systems such as Amazon Mechanical Turk (e.g., Rand, 2012), or financial
systems such as BitCoin (Babaioff et al. 2012).
In this paper, we are concerned with the problem of sharing the collective
proceeds generated from hierarchical ventures. To analyze this problem,
we consider a stylized model in which a group of agents are involved in
a joint venture. The group is structured in several layers, each reflecting
a different degree of responsibility, command, or even seniority. Thus, an
agent located at a given layer is in command of (or, at least, held accountable
for) all agents located at a lower layer. In such a hierarchy, agents are
characterized by their degree of responsibility (location in the hierarchy),
and the individual revenue they produce for the joint venture. Based on that
information, the issue is how to allocate the overall produced revenue among
the agents. Our stylized model is flexible enough to accommodate various
forms of organizations that are frequent in different professional sectors.
Instances are law firms (e.g., Galanter and Palay, 1990), physicians’ practice
arrangements (e.g., Kletke et al., 1996) as well as renowned architectural
practices (e.g., Winch and Schneider, 1993).
Two focal, and somewhat polar, allocation rules can be considered for
the setting described above. On the one hand, the no-transfer rule, in which
each agent keeps her share (thus, ignoring the command structure conveyed
by the hierarchy). On the other hand, the full-transfer rule, in which the
agent at the top of the hierarchy (the boss, or venture capitalist) gets all the
proceeds (thus, ignoring individual contributions to the joint proceeds). A
compromise between the two polar rules, in which certain upward transfers
are allowed, can be formalized, and we do so in this paper. The resulting
family of transfer rules is close in spirit to the MIT strategy (e.g., Pickard
et al., 2011), the winning strategy for the so-called DARPA Network Chal-
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lenge.1 Such a strategy can be seen as a specific geometric (incentive tree)
mechanism (e.g., Lv and Moscibroda, 2013). An incentive tree models the
participation of people in crowdsourcing or human tasking systems. An in-
centive tree mechanism is an algorithm that determines how much reward
each individual participant receives based on all the participants’ contribu-
tions, as well as the structure of the solicitation tree. In geometric (incentive
tree) mechanisms, a certain fraction α ‘bubbles-up’ from one agent to the
immediate superior, a fraction α2 bubbles up to the immediate superior of
the immediate superior, and so forth. In our case, a transfer rule imposes
that the lowest-ranked agent gets a share λ of her revenue, her immediate
superior gets a share λ of her revenue, and of any remaining ‘surplus’ from
the lowest-ranked agent, etc.
We provide normative foundations for the family of transfer rules de-
scribed above. In the benchmark case of linear hierarchies, we show that
the family is characterized by four simple and intuitive axioms (Lowest Rank
Consistency, Highest Rank Revenue Independence, Highest Rank Splitting
Neutrality, and Scale Invariance). If we add an additional axiom, referring
to two-agent problems in which the boss is not productive, the intermediate
rule is singled out within the family. If, instead, axioms modeling order
preservation (with respect to either individual revenues, or the command
structure) are added, the two polar rules are singled out.
The intermediate member of the family, which translates to our context
the MIT strategy mentioned above, is also singled out as an optimal rule,
when we enrich our framework to deal with endogenous hierarchies. More
precisely, suppose the aim is to maximize the expected revenues of the agent
at the top of the hierarchy (the boss), when the process to get subordinates
is probabilistic and based on the upward transfers the rules allow. The boss,
while selecting a transfer rule, would face a tradeoff: high upward transfers
vs. weak incentives for subordinates to join the hierarchy voluntarily. We
show that the optimal rule to deal with such a tradeoff is precisely the
intermediate member of the family. This occurs, not only when (possible)
subordinates are myopic, but also when they are farsighted and take into
account their ability to hire further subordinates themselves.
Our contribution is also related to the sizable literature on fair division
in networks. This literature mostly organizes itself into two strands.
On the one hand, the strand in which the networks give rise to cooper-
1This is a social network mobilization experiment, conducted by the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency, to identify distributed mobilization strategies and demonstrate
how quickly a challenging geolocation problem could be solved by crowdsourcing.
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ative games and where the structure of the network is exploited in order to
define fair allocation among agents connected in the graph. The canonical
case is that of cost sharing within a rooted tree, which can be traced back
to Claus and Kleitman (1973) and Bird (1976). For fixed trees, the so-called
Bird rule, which can be seen as a counterpart to the no-transfer rule, and the
so-called serial rules, which convey a different form of transfers to the ones
described above, are prominent. A specific (and well-known) instance of this
case is the so-called airport problem (e.g., Littlechild and Owen, 1973), in
which the runway cost has to be shared among different types of airplanes
with a linear graph representing the runway. The rules (and some of the
axioms) highlighted in our work will also be reminiscent of some of the rules
considered for airport problems. A common feature for the models within
this strand of the literature is that the cheapest connection (minimal dis-
tance) to the root becomes a crucial element, as it represents the stand-alone
option for the agents. This is not the case in our model, where the crucial
feature is the combination of the agents’ revenues and the location in the
hierarchy. Consequently stand-alone options are not naturally specified.
On the other hand, there is a strand of the literature where networks
restrict cooperative games. Myerson (1977, 1980) pioneered this approach
by using graphs to represent permission structures in cooperative games. A
central result within this approach is that if agents are allowed to cooperate
in tree structures, the original TU-game need only be superadditive to guar-
antee that the graph-restricted game has a non-empty core (e.g., Demange,
2004). In our model, there is no predefined cooperative game where the
hierarchies are restricting cooperation. Instead, we relate fairness directly
to the network structure. Our analysis, nevertheless, relates to the case of
TU-games with precedence structure (e.g., Grabisch and Sudho¨lter, 2014).
Therein, the set of players has a hierarchical structure, and a coalition is
feasible if, for each player in the coalition, all the players preceding her in
the hierarchy are also members of the coalition.
Finally, our work is also related to the so-called river-sharing problems
(e.g., Ambec and Sprumont, 2002) and the monetary compensations for
queueing problems (e.g., Maniquet, 2003). In the former case, a group of
agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and
money, and the issue is to allocate the (river) water, as well as to design
the ensuing monetary transfers. In the latter case, agents queue to receive a
service and the issue is to design appropriate monetary compensations based
on their waiting costs. In our problem, (monetary) transfer rules have to be
designed too. On the other hand, the only input to do so is the position in
the hierarchy.
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2 Linear hierarchies
We present in this section our benchmark model dealing with linear hierar-
chies. Suppose there exists a set of potential agents, identified with the set
of natural numbers. LetM be the class of finite subsets of natural numbers,
with generic element M . Each set M ∈ M will represent a linear hierar-
chy, with the convention that lower numbers in M refer to lower positions
in the hierarchy. For instance, if M = {1, . . . ,m}, then 1 is representing
the agent with the lowest rank in the hierarchy, whereas m is representing
the agent with the highest rank. In an ownership structure, m would be
interpreted as the boss, or the venture capitalist.
Agents in each linear hierarchy will be involved in a joint venture to
which all of them contribute. Formally, for each i ∈ M , let ri ∈ R+ be the
revenue that agent i generates, and r = (ri)i∈M the profile of revenues.2
A linear hierarchy revenue sharing problem, or simply, a problem is a
duplet consisting of a linear hierarchy M ∈ M and a profile of revenues
r ∈ R|M |+ . Let RM be the set of problems involving the hierarchy M and
R = ⋃M∈MRM .
Given a problem (M, r) ∈ R, an allocation is a vector x ∈ R|M | satis-
fying the following two conditions:
(i) for each i ∈M , 0 ≤ xi ≤
∑
j≤i rj , and
(ii)
∑
i∈M xi =
∑
i∈M ri.
Condition (i), which we refer to as boundedness, sets that agents can
neither get a negative payment, nor a higher payment than the aggregate
revenue generated by their subordinates in the hierarchy (including the agent
herself). Condition (ii), which we call balance, sets that the total revenue
is fully allocated among the agents in the hierarchy.
An allocation rule is a mapping φ assigning to each problem (M, r) ∈ R
an allocation φ(M, r). We assume from the outset that rules are anony-
mous, i.e., for each problem (M, r) ∈ R, and for each strictly monotonic
bijective function g : M → M ′, φg(i)(M ′, r′) = φi(M, r), where r′g(i) = ri,
for each i ∈ M . Thus, in what follows for this section, we assume, without
loss of generality, that M = {1, . . . ,m}.
Two (polar) examples of rules are those capturing the minimal and max-
imal possible revenue transfers from subordinates to their superiors in the
hierarchy.
2For each M ∈ M, each S ⊆ M , and each z ∈ Rm, let zS = (zi)i∈S . For each i ∈ M ,
let z−i = zM\{i}.
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More precisely, the first one imposes that each agent in the linear hierar-
chy keeps her own revenue and transfers nothing to her superiors. Formally,
No-Transfer rule, φNT: For each (M, r) ∈ R,
φNT (M, r) = r.
Its polar rule imposes that the boss receives all revenues. Formally,
Full-Transfer rule, φFT: For each (M, r) ∈ R,
φFT (M, r) =
(
0, . . . , 0,
∑
i∈M
ri
)
.
In between the two extreme rules presented above a vast number of rules
can be imagined. Instead of endorsing a specific rule directly, we take an ax-
iomatic approach and propose first several axioms reflecting principles that
we find normatively appealing in the context of these problems. Ultimately,
our goal will be to single out rules as a result of combining those axioms.
We start with the principle of consistency, an operational notion that
has played an instrumental role in axiomatic analyses of diverse problems,
and for which normative underpins have also been provided (e.g., Thomson,
2012). The principle refers to the way in which rules react to agents leaving
the scene with their awarded amounts. Here we concentrate on a minimal-
istic version of the principle referring only to the case in which the agent
with the lowest rank leaves the hierarchy after the allocation took place. It
seems natural to assume that subordinates refer to their immediate superi-
ors in the linear hierarchy to terminate their relationship. Thus, we assume
that, after leaving, a new problem arises in which the agent with the second-
lowest rank in the original problem becomes the lowest-ranked agent, but
now also generating the eventual revenue that the leaving agent generated
in the original problem and did not take in the allocation. The next axiom
states that the solution of the new problem agrees with the solution of the
original problem for all the standing agents in the hierarchy.3 Formally,
Lowest Rank Consistency: For each (M, r) ∈ R,
φM\{1}(M, r) = φ
(
M \ {1}, (r2 + r1 − φ1(M, r), rM\{1,2})
)
.
The next two properties focus on the opposite edge of the hierarchy.
3This axiom is actually reminiscent of the so-called “first agent consistency” axiom
proposed by Potters and Sudho¨lter (1999) for airport problems.
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The first one says that the revenue generated by the highest-ranked
agent (i.e., the boss) is irrelevant for the allocation of all the subordinates.
A plausible rationale for this axiom is that, in an ownership structure, the
boss is the indisputable owner of her own revenue. Formally,
Highest Rank Revenue Independence: For each (M, r) ∈ R, and each
rˆm ∈ R+,
φM\{m}(M, r) = φM\{m} (M, (r−m, rˆm)) .
The second one avoids certain strategic manipulations of the allocation
by the highest-ranked agent. More precisely, it says that the boss can-
not benefit from splitting her revenue into two amounts represented by two
agents ranked highest in the new hierarchy.4 Formally,
Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality: For each (M, r) ∈ R, let (M ′, r′) ∈
R be such that M ′ = M ∪{k}, k > m, rm = r′k+r′m, and r′M\{m} = rM\{m}.
Then,
φM\{m}(M ′, r′) = φM\{m} (M, r) .
Finally, we consider a technical property stating that if revenues are
scaled by a factor α, so is the solution. In particular, the axiom says that
the currency in which we measure revenue is irrelevant for the allocation
process.5
Scale Invariance: For each (M, r) ∈ R, and each α > 0,
φ(M,αr) = αφ(M, r).
The no-transfer rule and the full-transfer rule presented above satisfy
the previous four axioms. Both rules are extreme in an obvious sense, which
suggests that the set of all rules satisfying the axioms should consist of
those resulting from a compromise between them. It turns out that this
compromise can be described as follows:
Suppose the lowest-ranked agent gets a share λ ∈ [0, 1] of her revenue, her
immediate superior gets a share λ of her revenue, as well as any remaining
‘surplus’ from the lowest-ranked agent, etc., and the highest-ranked agent
4Axioms of this sort have been widely explored in various models of resource allocation
(e.g., Ju et al., 2007). Note that our axiom only requires “splitting-proofness” in a specific
situation, which makes it weaker than the standard counterpart axioms in such a literature.
5This axiom appears frequently in axiomatic studies of resource allocation (e.g., Fried-
man and Moulin, 1999; Hougaard and Tvede, 2015).
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gets the residual. Hence, if M = {1, . . . ,m}, payment shares are determined
recursively as
xλi = λri + (1− λ)xλi−1, (1)
for each i ∈M \ {m}, with the notational convention that xλ0 = 0. Further-
more,
xλm =
m∑
i=1
ri −
m−1∑
i=1
xλi . (2)
Note that we may rewrite (1) and (2) in the closed-form expressions
xλi = λ
(
ri + (1− λ)ri−1 + · · ·+ (1− λ)i−1r1
)
,
for i = 1, . . . ,m− 1 and
xλm = rm + (1− λ)rm−1 + · · ·+ (1− λ)m−1r1.
Denote the corresponding family of allocation rules, so defined, which
we call transfer rules, by {φλ}λ∈[0,1]. Note that the rule φ1 corresponds to
the no-transfer allocation rule, whereas φ0 corresponds to the full-transfer
allocation rule.
Example 1: Consider the problem ({1, 2, 3}, (12, 6, 12)), i.e., a linear hier-
archy made of three agents, 1, 2, and 3, in which agent 1 generates a revenue
of 12, agent 2 a revenue of 6, and agent 3 a revenue of 12. Figure 1 below
illustrates the situation.
6
12
2
3
121
?
?
Figure 1: A linear hierarchy.
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It is straightforward to see that the no-transfer rule selects the alloca-
tion (12, 6, 12) for this example, whereas the full-transfer rule selects the
allocation (0, 0, 30). In general, the transfer rules select the allocations
(12λ, (18− 12λ)λ, 30(1− λ) + 12λ2),
for each λ ∈ [0, 1]. In particular, for λ = 0.5, the corresponding transfer
rule selects the allocation (6, 6, 18). Thus, in such a case, agent 2 receives
the same as agent 1, despite the fact that agent 1 is generating twice the
revenue.
For hierarchies involving agents generating equal revenues, the transfer
rules can be fully ranked by means of the Lorenz criterion %L, according to
the parameter describing the family.6 More precisely, for each (M, r) ∈ R,
such that ri = rj for each pair i, j ∈ N , it follows that φλ(M, r) %L φλ′(M, r)
if and only if λ ≥ λ′.
Our main result, stated next, shows that the family of transfer rules is
characterized by the combination of the axioms introduced above.
Theorem 1 A rule φ satisfies Lowest Rank Consistency, Highest Rank Rev-
enue Independence, Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality, and Scale Invariance
if and only if it is a transfer rule, i.e., φ ∈ {φλ}λ∈[0,1].
Proof: It is not difficult to see that the transfer rules satisfy all the axioms in
the statement of the theorem. As an illustration, we show that they satisfy
Lowest Rank Consistency. To do so, let λ ∈ [0, 1] and (M, r) ∈ R be given.
For each i ∈M , let xi = φλi (M, r) and x˜i = φλi
(
M \ {1}, (r2 + r1 − x1, rM\{1,2})
)
.
Then, x˜2 = λ(r2 + r1 − x1) = x2. For each j 6= m, x˜j = λrj + (1− λ)x˜j−1.
Thus, by induction, x˜j = xj and x˜m = rm + rm−1 − x1 −
∑n−1
k=2 x˜k = xm.
We now suppose that φ is a rule satisfying all the axioms in the statement
of the theorem. First, let M = {1} and r = r1. By balance, φ1(M, r) =
r1 = φλ1(M, r), for each λ ∈ [0, 1]. Next, add a superior agent 2 with
revenue r2. Let M ′ = {1, 2} and r′ = (r1, r2). Then, by boundedness,
φ1(M ′, r′) ∈ [0, r1], so φ1(M ′, r′) = λr1 = φλ1(M ′, r′) for some λ ∈ [0, 1]. By
Highest Rank Revenue Independence, λ is independent of r2. Moreover, λ
is independent of r1. To see this, suppose, by contradiction, that we have
6Given two vectors, we say that the former Lorenz dominates the latter if its smallest
coordinate is at least as large as the smallest coordinate of the second vector, the sum of
its two smallest coordinates is at least as large as the corresponding sum for the second
vector, and so on.
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r˜ = (r˜1, r˜2) with r2 = r˜2 and φ1(M ′, r′) = λr1 and φ1(M ′, r˜) = λ˜r˜1 with
λ 6= λ˜. Then, by Scale Invariance, φ1(M ′, er1r1 r) = er1r1λr1 = λr˜1 6= λ˜r˜1,
contradicting that λ is independent of r2. Now, by balance, φ2(M ′, r′) =
r2 − r1 − φ1(M ′, r′) = φλ2(M ′, r′).
Next, suppose there is λ such that φ = φλ for all problems with up to
k agents, k ≥ 2. Now, consider the problem (Mk, rk) with Mk = {1, . . . , k}
and rk = {r1, . . . , rk} and add an agent k + 1. By Highest Rank Rev-
enue Independence, and Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality, φi(Mk+1, rk+1) =
φi(Mk, rk) = φλi (M
k, rk) for all i ≤ k − 1. By Lowest Rank Consistency,
φk(Mk+1, rk+1) = φk(Mk+1\{1}, rk+12 +rk+11 −φ1(Mk+1, rk+1), rMk+1\{1,2})
and thus, by the induction hypothesis, φk(Mk+1, rk+1) = φλk(M
k+1, rk+1).
Finally, by balance,
φk+1(Mk+1, rk+1) = rk+1 −
k∑
i=1
φλi (M
k+1, rk+1) = φλk+1(M
k+1, rk+1).
Theorem 1 is tight:
• The classical serial rule (e.g., Moulin and Shenker, 1992) imposes that
each agent’s revenue is split equally among her superiors and herself.
In Example 1, it would yield the allocation (4, 7, 19). The serial rule
violates Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality, while satisfying all the re-
maining axioms at the statement of Theorem 1.
• Another natural rule is the one in which all agents keep a fraction λ
of their own revenue and the boss receives the residual. In Example
1, it would yield the allocation (6, 3, 21), for the case with λ = 0.5.
This rule violates Lowest Rank Consistency, while satisfying all the
remaining axioms at the statement of Theorem 1.
• The hybrid rule obtained while using the full-transfer rule if∑mj=2 rj <
r1, and the zero-transfer rule otherwise, is another well-defined rule for
our setting. This rule violates Highest Rank Revenue Independence,
while satisfying all the remaining axioms at the statement of Theorem
1.
• Finally, a rule defined as a transfer rule, but in which λ depends on
the sum of the revenues, violates Scale Invariance, while satisfying all
the remaining axioms at the statement of Theorem 1.
9
It is worth noting that the parameter defining each transfer rule is in-
dependent of individual revenues. This fact follows from the axiom of Scale
Invariance. As such, what just appears to be a requirement of independence
of monetary units, actually has normative impact in our setting.
In what follows, we complement the above characterization result by
adding several new axioms, which will will single out focal members of our
family.
We start with an axiom referring to canonical two-agent problems in
which the boss is not productive. For those settings, one might find appeal-
ing to allocate revenues equally. A plausible rationale is that, although the
lowest-ranked agent is the only productive one, the boss is also necessary
for the production to take place. Formally,
Canonical Fairness: For each x ∈ R+, φ({1, 2}, (x, 0)) = (x2 , x2 ).
The intermediate rule of the family is the only transfer rule satisfying
the previous axiom. As a matter of fact, and as shown by the next result,
the rule is characterized when replacing scale covariance in Theorem 1 by
this new axiom.
Theorem 2 A rule φ satisfies Lowest Rank Consistency, Highest Rank Rev-
enue Independence, Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality, and Canonical Fair-
ness if and only if it is the intermediate transfer rule, i.e., φ ≡ φ0.5.
Proof: By Theorem 1, we know that φ0.5 satisfies the first three axioms of
the statement. It is straightforward to see that it also satisfies Canonical
Fairness. Conversely, suppose that φ is a rule satisfying all the axioms in the
statement of the theorem. First, let M = {1, 2} and r = (r1, r2). By High-
est Rank Revenue Independence, φ1(M, r) = φ1(M, (r1, 0)). By Canonical
Fairness, φ1(M, (r1, 0)) = r12 . Then, by balance, φ(M, r) = (
r1
2 , r2 +
r1
2 ) =
φ0.5(M, r).
Next, suppose that φ ≡ φ0.5 for all problems with up to k agents,
k ≥ 2. Now, consider the problem (Mk, rk) with Mk = {1, . . . , k} and rk =
{r1, . . . , rk} and add an agent k+1. By Highest Rank Revenue Independence,
and Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality, φi(Mk+1, rk+1) = φi(Mk, rk) = φ0.5i (M
k, rk)
for all i ≤ k−1. By Lowest Rank Consistency, φk(Mk+1, rk+1) = φk(Mk+1\
{1}, rk+12 + rk+11 − φ1(Mk+1, rk+1), rMk+1\{1,2}) and thus, by the induction
hypothesis, φk(Mk+1, rk+1) = φ0.5k (M
k+1, rk+1). Finally, by balance,
φk+1(Mk+1, rk+1) = rk+1−
k∑
i=1
φ0.5i (M
k+1, rk+1) = φ0.5k+1(M
k+1, rk+1).
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It is worth mentioning that φ0.5 satisfies a stronger version of Canonical
Fairness, which indicates that in a hierarchy in which only the lowest-ranked
agent is productive, each agent gets one half of the incoming revenue and
bubble ups the remainder. More precisely, if the revenue of the lowest-
ranked agent is x, this agent keeps x/2, her immediate superior gets x/4,
the immediate superior to the latter gets x/8, etc. This is precisely the
rationale behind the so-called MIT strategy, which is described in more
detail in Section 3.
We now consider two new axioms formalizing two polar forms of order
preservation.
The first axiom states that agents producing higher revenues should be
awarded more. Formally,
Revenue Order Preservation: For each (M, r) ∈ R, and each pair i, j ∈
M such that ri ≥ rj , φi(M, r) ≥ φj(M, r).
The zero-transfer rule is the only transfer rule satisfying the previous
axiom. More interestingly, and as shown by the next result, the rule is
characterized by such an axiom in combination with Highest Rank Revenue
Independence.
Theorem 3 A rule satisfies Highest Rank Revenue Independence and Rev-
enue Order Preservation if and only if it is the zero-transfer rule.
Proof: We concentrate on the non-trivial implication, i.e., let φ be a rule
satisfying Highest Rank Revenue Independence and Revenue Order Preser-
vation. Let (M, r) ∈ R be given. We claim first that ∑m−1j=1 φj(M, r) ≤∑m−1
j=1 rj . By contradiction, assume otherwise. Then, by Highest Rank Rev-
enue Independence we can vary rm without affecting the shares of the other
agents (i = 1, . . . ,m− 1). Thus, let rm <
∑m−1
j=1 φj(M, r)−
∑m−1
j=1 rj , which
contradicts either boundedness or balance.
As
∑m−1
j=1 φj(M, r) ≤
∑m−1
j=1 rj , balance implies that φm(M, r) ≥ rm.
Thus, letting rm = ri for any i = 1, . . . ,m − 1 we get, by Revenue Order
Preservation, that φi(M, r) = φm(M, r) ≥ ri. Now, balance gives φi(M, r) =
ri for all i ∈M .
The next axiom states that agents located higher in the hierarchy should
be awarded more. Formally,
Hierarchical Order Preservation: For each (M, r) ∈ R, and each pair
i, j ∈M , where i ≥ j, φi(M, r) ≥ φj(M, r).
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The full-transfer rule is the only transfer rule satisfying the previous
axiom. More interestingly, and as shown by the next result, the rule is
characterized by such an axiom in combination with Highest Rank Splitting
Neutrality.
Theorem 4 A rule satisfies Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality and Hierar-
chical Order Preservation if and only if it is the full-transfer rule.
Proof: We concentrate on the non-trivial implication, i.e., let φ be a rule
satisfying Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality and Hierarchical Order Preser-
vation. By contradiction, suppose that there exists a problem (M, r) ∈ R
and an agent i 6= m, such that φi(M, r) =  > 0.
Consider a new problem (M ′, r′), where M ′ = {1, . . . ,m + x}, r′i = ri
for all i < m and
∑m+x
j=m r
′
j = rm. By Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality
φi(M ′, r′) = φi(M, r) for all i < m. Now, choose x >
Pm+x
j=1 φj(M
′,r′)
 . By
Hierarchical Order Preservation, φj(M ′, r′) ≥  for all j = m, . . . ,m + x,
which contradicts balance.
3 Optimal transfer rules
In this section, we consider a scenario in which the hierarchy reflects an
ownership structure, and the boss might select the allocation rule, subject to
incentive and fairness constraints. More precisely, we suppose that the boss
has to select the rule, among the family of transfer rules. Then, a tradeoff
emerges: a transfer rule associated with a low λ yields a high upward transfer
but also reduces the subordinates’ (expected) payoff and, thus, the incentive
to join the hierarchy voluntarily.
It is natural to assume that the probability of recruiting a (revenue-
generating) subordinate is connected to their potential earnings. A some-
what myopic approach would be to consider that the probability is equal to
λ itself. Another approach would assume that subordinates are farsighted
and would take into account their ability to hire further subordinates from
whom revenues will bubble up. In this latter case, the probability of getting
a subordinate would be represented by the ratio between agents’ payoffs and
revenues. In what follows, we analyze both cases. For ease of exposition, we
assume that all revenues are normalized to unity.
We first consider the case in which λ is the probability that any agent in
the hierarchy gets a subordinate. That is, if the boss selects the full-transfer
rule the probability of having agents to join the hierarchy as subordinates
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is 0, as all their revenues are transferred to the boss. Likewise, using the
no-transfer rule the probability is 1, as agents keep their own revenue. In
general, using a transfer rule, the boss’ expected revenue is given by
∞∑
t=0
(1− λ)t
Now, if the boss aims to maximize total revenue in expected terms, when
λ denotes the probability that an agent within a linear hierarchy gets a
subordinate, the following problem should be solved:
max
λ
∞∑
t=1
((1− λ)λ)t.
It is straightforward to see that the previous problem is equivalent to the
following one:
max
λ
(1− λ)λ,
whose solution is λ = 0.5.
As an illustration, note that the expected transfer from subordinates to
the boss at (optimal) λ = 0.5 is
∑∞
t=1(1/4)
t = 1/3.
We now assume that (possible) subordinates are farsighted and, thus,
take into account their ability to hire further subordinates (once in the
hierarchy) from whom revenues would bubble up.
Let δ denote the probability of getting a subordinate (and, thus, the
payoff of any non-boss agent). In this (farsighted) case, the boss would
solve the problem
sup
λ,δ
∞∑
t=1
((1− λ)δ)t, (3)
under the constraint that
δ = λ+ λ
∞∑
t=1
((1− λ)δ)t. (4)
It is not difficult to show that the only two possible solutions of (4) are
δ = 1, or δ = λ1−λ . In the former case, as the probability of getting a subordi-
nate is 1, agents will accept any share λ because they get an infinite stream
of payoff bubbling up from agents below: it is therefore profit maximizing
13
for the boss to set λ → 0. In the latter case, it follows that (3) is solved
when λ→ 0.5 and δ → 1.
It is interesting to note that the transfer rule with λ = 0.5 has a close
relation to the so-called MIT strategy (e.g., Pickard et al., 2011), a specific
mechanism for solving a task via linear recruitment graphs. More precisely,
suppose solving the task amounts to a benefit of B dollars. Then, the MIT
strategy imposes the following payment scheme: the agent who solves the
task keeps B/2, then her recruiter gets B/4, the recruiter’s recruiter gets
B/8, and, so forth.7 Such a strategy corresponds exactly to the transfer rule
with λ = 0.5, in a situation where the revenue of the lowest-ranked agent is
B and all other agents have revenue 0, provided the boss gets to keep the
residual (due to the balance condition of our rules).
In the next two sections we return to fixed hierarchies generalizing the
model to cover branch hierarchies and joint ownership structures.
4 Branch hierarchies
In this section, we extend the linear-hierarchy case considered above to ac-
count for branch hierarchies, i.e., situations in which a given agent can have
more than one immediate subordinate.
We represent a branch hierarchy as a tree, where each agent is connected
to the (unique) boss via a unique rank path consisting of all her superiors
(see Figure 2).
7Note that this mechanism is never in deficit, i.e., the residual from B, after obeying
this payment scheme, is always non-negative.
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Figure 2: A branch hierarchy. This figure illustrates a branch hierarchy involving
five agents, with agent 5 denoting the boss, agents 3 and 4 her direct subordinates and
agents 1 and 2 being the subordinates of agent 3. Each of the two agents at the third layer
generate a revenue of 1. Agent 4 yields a revenue of 6, whereas agent 3 yields a revenue
of 16. Finally, agent 5 yields a revenue of 10. In summary, the hierarchy so illustrated
is (N, r, s) = ({1, 2, 3, 4, 5}, (1, 1, 16, 6, 10), s), where s(1) = s(2) = 3, s(3) = s(4) = 5 and
s(5) = ∅.
A branch hierarchy revenue sharing problem, or simply, a b-problem
is a triple (N, r, s), where N is a non-empty finite set of agents, r is a
revenue profile specifying the revenue of each agent in N , and s is a function
mapping each agent i ∈ N to her immediate superior agent j = s(i) (with
the convention that s(i) = ∅ if i is the boss), such that the graph induced
by s has no cycles.8 Let B denote the set of b-problems.
Given a b-problem (N, r, s), a b-allocation is a vector x ∈ R|N | sat-
isfying the counterpart conditions of boundedness, and balance in this
setting. A b-allocation rule is a mapping β assigning to each problem
(N, r, s) an allocation β(N, r, s) = x. We also impose from the outset, as in
the linear case, that rules are anonymous, i.e., for each strictly monotonic
bijective function g : N → N ′, βg(i)(N ′, r′, s′) = βi(N, r, s), where r′g(i) = ri,
and s′(g(i)) = s(i) for each i ∈ N .
8Note the deliberate change in notation from M (in the linear case) to N , as “places”
in the hierarchy do not make sense for non-linear hierarchies.
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The transfer rules have a simple generalization to branch hierarchies.
Formally, let i be an agent at the bottom of the hierarchy, somewhere in the
tree. Then,
xλi = λri.
His immediate superior k = s(i) gets
xλk = λ
rk + ∑
j∈N : k=s(j)
(1− λ)rj
 ,
and so forth. Denote the corresponding family of b-allocation rules by
{βλ}λ∈[0,1].
Our axioms from the linear hierarchy model also have a natural extension
to the branch hierarchy model. Formally,
b-Lowest Rank Consistency: For each (N, r, s) ∈ B, and each i ∈ N
without subordinates,
βN\{i}(N, r, s) = β
(
N \ {i}, (rs(i) + ri − βi(N, r, s), rN\{i,s(i)}), sN\{i}
)
.
b-Highest Rank Revenue Independence: For each (N, r, s) ∈ B and
each rˆi ∈ R+, if i is the boss, then
βN\{i}(N, r, s) = βN\{i} (N, (r−i, rˆi), s) .
b-Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality: For each (N, r, s) ∈ B where
agent i is the boss, let (N ′, r′, s′), be such that N ′ = N ∪ {k}, s′(i) = k,
s = s′ otherwise, ri = r′k + r
′
i, and r
′
N\{i,k} = rN\{i}. Then,
βN\{i,k}(N ′, r′, s′) = βN\{i} (N, r, s) .
b-Scale Invariance: For each (N, r, s) ∈ B, and each α > 0,
β(N,αr, s) = αβ(N, r, s).
With these extended axioms in place we can now extend Theorem 1 to
branch hierarchies.
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Theorem 5 A b-rule β satisfies b-Lowest Rank Consistency, b-Highest Rank
Revenue Independence, b-Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality, and b-Scale In-
variance if and only if it is a b- transfer rule, i.e., β ∈ {βλ}λ∈[0,1].
Proof: It is not difficult to see that the b-transfer rules satisfy all the axioms
at the statement of the theorem. Conversely, let β be a rule satisfying all the
axioms at the statement of the theorem. Let (N, r, s) ∈ B. We distinguish
two cases.
Case 1: (N, r, s) is a linear hierarchy.
In this case, the branch hierarchy (N, r, s) ∈ B consists of a line, and
thus we use the abbreviated notation (N, r) ∈ R. Then, by Theorem 1,
there exists λ ∈ [0, 1], such that β(N, r) = βλ(N, r).
Case 2: (N, r, s) is not a linear hierarchy.
Let i denote an agent without subordinates in the branch hierarchy
(N, r, s). By boundedness, xi = βi(N, r, s) = δri for some δ ∈ [0, 1].
Iteratively, we can apply b-Lowest Rank Consistency to all agents not
located on the direct path of superiors from i to the boss, in order to reduce
the branch hierarchy to a line. For each iteration, the payment remains
unchanged for agent i and we, ultimately, end up with a linear hierarchy. It
then follows from Case 1 that δ = λ.
The previous argument can be repeated for any agent without subordi-
nates, which shows that δ is not agent-specific. Thus, xj = βλj (N, r, s), for
each agent j without subordinates. Now, consider an agent h who is the
immediate superior of an agent without subordinates. By using b-Lowest
Rank Consistency, for each subordinate of h, we obtain a new problem in
which agent h has no subordinates, and in which the revenue of agent h cor-
responds to her original revenue, plus the surplus from all the subordinates
of h. Applying the same argument as above, it follows that xh = βλh(N, r, s).
The proof easily concludes from here.
5 Joint ownerships
An important limitation of the previous analysis is that hierarchies contain
a single boss. It is often the case that a given agent has more than one
superior, in which case we talk about joint ownerships. For instance, two
firms may jointly own an entity on an equal partnership basis and that entity
may again own other entities, either alone or as joint ventures. Similarly,
for social mobilization schemes, an agent may be approached by several
recruiters and may solve tasks for all of them. The aim of this section is to
17
extend the previous analysis to account for the case of joint ownerships. As
we shall see, a generalized version of our family of transfer rules will also
arise in this setting.
A joint ownership revenue sharing problem, or simply, a j-problem is a
triple (N, r, S), where N is a non-empty finite set of agents, r is a revenue
profile specifying the revenue of each agent in N , and S is a correspondence,
mapping each agent i ∈ N to her immediate superior agents S(i) ⊂ N (with
the convention that S(i) = ∅ if i is a boss), such that the graph induced by
S is connected and has no cycles. Let J denote the set of j-problems.
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Figure 3: A joint ownership. This figure illustrates a joint ownership involving six
agents, with agents 5 and 6 denoting the bosses, agent 3 being direct subordinate of
both, agent 4 direct subordinate of 6, and agents 1 and 2 being the subordinates of agent
3. Each of the two agents at the third layer generate a revenue of 1. Agent 3 yields a
revenue of 16, whereas agent 4 yields a revenue of 5. Finally, agent 5 yields a revenue
of 9, and agent 6 yields a revenue of 10. In summary, the problem so illustrated is
(N, r, S) = ({1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, (1, 1, 16, 5, 9, 10), S), where S(1) = S(2) = 3, S(3) = {5, 6},
S(4) = 6 and S(5) = S(6) = ∅.
Note that, as the graph induced by S has no cycles, deleting any link
ij leads to two components of such a graph, dubbed the i- and the j-
component, and denoted by Giij and G
j
ij respectively.
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Given a j-problem (N, r, S), a j-allocation is a vector x ∈ R|N | satisfying
the counterpart conditions of boundedness, and balance in this setting.
In particular, boundedness is satisfied when, for each i ∈ S(j), the sum
of payoffs in the j-component does not exceed the sum of revenues in the
j-component.
A j-allocation rule is a mapping ζ assigning to each problem (N, r, S)
an allocation ζ(N, r, S) = x. We also impose from the outset, as in the linear
case, that rules are anonymous, i.e., for each strictly monotonic bijective
function g : N → N ′, ζg(i)(N ′, r′, S′) = ζi(N, r, S), where r′g(i) = ri, and
S′(g(i)) = S(i) for each i ∈ N . Our family of transfer rules generalizes
easily to the joint ownership setting by transferring an equal split of the
accumulated surplus of a given agent i to each of her immediate superiors.
Formally, let i be an agent at the bottom of the hierarchy, somewhere in
the tree. Then,
xλi = λri.
Each of her immediate superiors k ∈ S(i) gets
xλk = λ
rk + ∑
j∈N : k∈S(j)
1
|S(j)|(1− λ)rj
 ,
and so forth. Denote the corresponding family of j-allocation rules by
{ζλ}λ∈[0,1].
Three of our axioms from the linear hierarchy model have a natural
extension to the joint ownership model. Formally,
j-Highest Rank Revenue Independence: For each (N, r, S) ∈ J and
i ∈ N such that S(i) = ∅, and each rˆi ∈ R+,
ζN\{i}(N, r, S) = ζN\{i} (N, (r−i, rˆi), S) .
j-Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality: For each (N, r, S) ∈ J and i ∈ N
such that S(i) = ∅, let (N ′, r′, S′), be such that N ′ = N ∪ {k}, S′(i) = k,
S′ = S otherwise, ri = r′k + r
′
i, and r
′
N\{i,k} = rN\{i}. Then,
ζN\{i,k}(N ′, r′, S′) = ζN\{i} (N, r, S) .
j-Scale Invariance: For each (N, r, S) ∈ J , and each α > 0,
ζ(N,αr, S) = αζ(N, r, S).
19
On the other hand, the fact that a joint ownership might involve several
bosses, as well as several superiors for the lowest ranked agents, calls for
adjustments of the remaining axioms, as well as for new axioms.
We first strengthen lowest rank consistency. To do so, consider an agent i
and one of her immediate subordinates j. It seems normatively appealing to
state that deleting the j-component, and transferring any surplus from that
component to i, should leave the payoffs of all agents in the i-component
unchanged. Formally,
Component Consistency: For each (N, r, S) ∈ J , and each pair i, j ∈ N
such that i ∈ S(j), let (N ′, r′, S′) ∈ J be such that
• N ′ = Giij ,
• r′i = ri +
∑
k∈Gjij (rk − ζk(N, r, S)),
• r′h = rh for each h ∈ Giij \ {i},
• S′(k) = S(k), for each k ∈ Giij .
Then, for each h ∈ N ′,
ζh(N ′, r′, S′) = ζh(N, r, S).
Clearly, component consistency implies lowest rank consistency, as the
j-component may consist of agent j alone.
The following two axioms are new. First, an axiom referring to the
simple case in which a unique lowest-ranked agent has several bosses with
identical revenues. The axiom requires that the payoff of these bosses should
be the same. Formally,
Top Symmetry: For each (N, r, S) ∈ J and each k ∈ N , such that S(k) =
N \ {k}, whereas, for each pair i, j ∈ N \ {k}, S(i) = S(j) = ∅, and ri = rj ,
it follows that
ζi(N, r, S) = ζj(N, r, S).
The second axiom refers to the case in which a given agent has several
bosses that are not bosses for any other agents. The axiom states that, in
those situations, a merge of the bosses will not change the payoff of the
remaining agents. Formally,
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Top Merger: For each (N, r, S) ∈ J and each j ∈ N such that |S(j)| ≥ 2,
S(k) = ∅ for each k ∈ S(j), and S(h) ∩ S(j) = ∅, for each h ∈ N \ {j}, let
(N ′, r′, S′) ∈ J be such that
• N ′ = (N \ {S(j)}) ∪ {k′},
• r′k′ =
∑
k∈S(j) rk,
• r′h = rh for each h ∈ N \ {S(j)},
• S′(k′) = ∅,
• S′(k) = S(k), for each k ∈ N \ {S(j)}.
Then, for each h ∈ N \ {S(j)},
ζh(N ′, r′, S′) = ζh(N, r, S).
We are now ready to extend Theorem 1 to joint ownership problems.
Theorem 6 A j-rule ζ satisfies j-Highest Rank Revenue Independence, j-
Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality, j-Scale Invariance, Component Consis-
tency, Top Symmetry, and Top Merger if and only if it is a j-transfer rule,
i.e., ζ ∈ {ζλ}λ∈[0,1].
Proof: It is not difficult to see that the j-transfer rules satisfy all the axioms
at the statement of the theorem. Conversely, let ζ be a rule satisfying all
the axioms at the statement of the theorem. We prove this implication
by induction. First, by Theorem 1, there exists λ such that ζ = ζλ for
two-agent problems. Suppose there is λ such that ζ = ζλ for all problems
with up to k ≥ 2 agents and consider the subfamily of problems with k + 1
agents. Let (N, r, S) ∈ J be one of those problems and let i ∈ N be such
that S−1(i) = ∅. We now claim that ζi(N, r, S) = λri. Indeed, by repeated
use of Component Consistency, we can construct a new problem for which
all other agents (different from i) have a unique linear path to i, such that
i’s payoff is unchanged. Now, by repeated use of Top Merger and j-Highest
Rank Splitting Neutrality, we obtain a new (two-agent) problem for which
agent i gets ζi(N, r, S) = λri.
Now, let j ∈ S(i). We claim that ∑
h∈Gjij ζh(N, r, S) =
∑
h∈Gjij rh +
(1−λ)ri
|S(i)| . Indeed, by repeated use of Component Consistency, Top Merger
and j-Highest Rank Splitting Neutrality we can reduce the j-components to
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a single agent, where this agent receives the same payoff as the entire j-
component did before. By j-Highest Rank Revenue Independence and Top
Symmetry the claim follows.
Consequently,
∑
h∈Giij ζh(N, r, S) =
∑
h∈Giij ζ
λ
h (N, r, S).
Now, for a given j ∈ S(i), by Component Consistency we can add the
surplus of the i-component, i.e.,
∑
h∈Giij (rh − ζh(N, r, S)), to j and then
eliminate the i-component. By our induction hypothesis, the payoff of an
arbitrary agent h ∈ Gjij is ζh(N, r, S) = ζλh (N, r, S), which concludes the
proof.
6 Conclusion
We have considered in this paper the problem of sharing the collective pro-
ceeds generated from a joint venture, in which participating agents, who
are hierarchically organized, contribute with (possibly different) individual
revenues to the collective proceeds. Our model is flexible enough to ac-
commodate several forms of professional organizations and practices in real
life.
We have introduced a family of allocation rules for our model, ranging
from the rule ignoring the command structure conveyed by the hierarchy, to
the rule ignoring individual contributions to the joint proceeds. The rules
are members of a one-parameter family with an interesting economic inter-
pretation conveying a compromise between those two polar rules, allowing
for certain upward transfers in the command structure.
The intermediate member of our family, obtained when the compromise
between the polar rules is balanced, is a translation to our context of the
so-called MIT strategy, which has shown to be an optimal mechanism in
practice for social mobilization. Our results therefore provide normative
foundations for such a type of strategy, as well as for some generalizations
of it, formalizing the idea of ‘bubbling up’ revenues along the hierarchy.
We also show that the rule is optimal, within our family, if the aim is to
maximize the expected revenues of the venture capitalist, i.e., the agent at
the top of the hierarchy, and the process to get subordinates is probabilistic.
Our analysis not only involves the benchmark case of linear hierarchies,
but also more general hierarchical structures, including cases of joint own-
ership. Thereby, our results also provide new insights for the popular field
of fair allocation in networks.
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